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ladytetra777William James' Varieties of Religious Experience chronicles a series of lectures given by James in the late 1800s as a psychologist's approach to possible knowledge of God. "What are religious propensities" and "what is their philosophical significance" (4) are the two questions James sets out to explore in Lecture I. In terms of logic, James is asking the former as a question of existence and the later as a question of value, which are intertwined yet easily distinguished in most religions, James claims. From a medical materialist standpoint, one can analyze the religious experience as observable changes in the brain, but this provides no answer as to the value of the experiences, leaving the linkage between James' original two questions open to further investigation.
Analyzing these experiences solely in terms of neurology does not provide a comprehensive account of these experiences for James. I am reminded of Descartes' discussion of the mind / body problem, and his solution of the pineal gland as a bridge between the two; here James states that unless there is a sufficient psycho-physical theory that connects select spiritual values to physiological change (14), appeals to medical materialism fail to provide a full account. He continues, asking how a religious experience could even be tested and measured in such a way.
He goes on to describe religious experiences as "higher" experiences, that religious happiness or religious trance connects the person experiencing it to a higher truth, which would presuppose value. He continues, saying "[r]eligious happiness is happiness...[r]eligious trance is trance" (24) to concretize the experience instead of dismissing it as a kind of neurosis.
The picture thus far is this: people have religious experiences, and those experiences change them somehow. As a psychologist, James cannot explain it merely in functions of the brain, but as a change following a religious experience is observable, it is legitimate. What James appears to be after is similar to Scotus: natural theology, as in, what can be meaningfully said of the religious experience and ultimately of God? So far, we can understand the concept as one of an additive experience, giving value to the person having it.
Analyzing these experiences solely in terms of neurology does not provide a comprehensive account of these experiences for James. I am reminded of Descartes' discussion of the mind / body problem, and his solution of the pineal gland as a bridge between the two; here James states that unless there is a sufficient psycho-physical theory that connects select spiritual values to physiological change (14), appeals to medical materialism fail to provide a full account. He continues, asking how a religious experience could even be tested and measured in such a way.
He goes on to describe religious experiences as "higher" experiences, that religious happiness or religious trance connects the person experiencing it to a higher truth, which would presuppose value. He continues, saying "[r]eligious happiness is happiness...[r]eligious trance is trance" (24) to concretize the experience instead of dismissing it as a kind of neurosis.
The picture thus far is this: people have religious experiences, and those experiences change them somehow. As a psychologist, James cannot explain it merely in functions of the brain, but as a change following a religious experience is observable, it is legitimate. What James appears to be after is similar to Scotus: natural theology, as in, what can be meaningfully said of the religious experience and ultimately of God? So far, we can understand the concept as one of an additive experience, giving value to the person having it.
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